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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a new vulnerability
of cyber-physical systems to malicious attack. It arises when
the physical plant, that is modeled as a continuous-time LTI
system, is controlled by a digital controller. In the sampled-data
framework, most anomaly detectors monitor the plant’s output
only at discrete time instants, and thus, nothing abnormal can
be detected as long as the sampled output behaves normal. This
implies that if an actuator attack drives the plant’s state to pass
through the kernel of the output matrix at each sensing time, then
the attack compromises the system while remaining stealthy. We
show that this type of attack always exists when the sampled-
data system has an input redundancy, i.e., the number of inputs
being larger than that of the outputs or the sampling rate of
the actuators being higher than that of the sensors. Simulation
results for the X-38 vehicle and for the other numerical examples
illustrate this new attack strategy possibly brings disastrous
consequences.
Index Terms—Networked control system, Cyber-physical sys-
tem, Sampled-data system, Actuator attack, Multi-rate control,
Cyber-physical attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT development of communication capabilities andcomputational resources has led to the integration of
cyber-technologies and physical processes, which improves
efficiency and flexibility of the system. These Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS) include not only simple or small devices, but
also a variety of critical infrastructures that are closely related
to public health and numerous financial costs. Examples
include nuclear facilities, power grid (smart grid), supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, and networked
transportation. For this reason, the security problem of CPS
has received a lot of attention in recent years.
In particular, cyber-attacks on CPS may bring disastrous
consequences, and their impacts are well illustrated by subse-
quent incidents, such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear
plant [1], massive power blackouts in South America [2],
Maroochy water breach in Australia [3], and cyber-attack
on the Ukrainian power grid [4]. These instances highlight
the need for measuring the vulnerabilities of CPS against
malicious attacks and unexpected errors. There have been
several researches that examine the vulnerabilities of CPS from
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the control-theoretic point of view. For instance, the weakness
of electric power grids, possibly caused by false data injection
attacks, was studied in [5]. An undetectable sensor attack to
the unstable system was presented in [6]. More recently, the
authors of [7] explored the question which resources should be
utilized for the attack design, also focusing on various attack
scenarios including denial of service (DoS) attack [8], replay
attack [9], zero-dynamics attack [10], local zero-dynamics
attack, and bias injection attack.
It is worth mentioning that most of the researches on secu-
rity problems of CPS have been studied either in continuous-
time or in discrete-time domain. From a practical stand-
point, however, usual cyber-physical systems are composed
of continuous-time physical plants and discrete-time digital
controllers. It means that, for thorough understanding of cyber-
security, interaction between the continuous-time and discrete-
time components should come into the picture. In this regard,
we are concerned with the security problem for sampled-
data control system that consists of a multi-input multi-output
(MIMO) continuous-time plant, samplers, and zero-order hold
(ZOH) devices. Specifically, we allow that the sampling rate
of the actuators be different from that of the sensors. These
multi-rate sampling schemes have been widely studied in the
literature for specific purposes. For example, a faster actuation
than sensing has been adopted to improve control performance
such as inter-sample behavior, disturbance rejection, and so on
[13]–[17]. On the other hand, faster sensing has advantages
on state feedback control design, acceleration control, and
security problem [18]–[20].
In this paper, we show that the sampled-data systems are
possibly vulnerable to a malicious adversary who utilizes an
input redundancy of the systems. This redundancy becomes
available to the attacker when (a) the sampling rate of the
actuator is faster than that of the sensor, or (b) the number
of inputs is larger than that of the outputs. Using the input
redundancy, we present a new type of stealthy attack in the
sampled-data framework. The underlying idea for the attack
design is to express the sampled-data system as an extended
lifted system with a stacked state variable, and to enforce the
state to remain a (nontrivial) kernel of its output matrix (at
sampling times). In doing so, the attack cannot be detected
by any (discrete-time) anomaly detector that is built upon the
sampled measurements of the output; at the same time, the
inter-sample behavior of the physical plant is compromised.
We will show that all of these can be done with the input
redundancy. It should be pointed out that, unlike the well-
known zero-dynamics attack [7], [10], [11], the proposed
attack policy is applicable even when there is no unstable
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2Fig. 1: Sampled-data system connected through network
zero (either for continuous-time model or for its sampled-data
counterpart).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the problem formulation. Section III provides
an attack design and studies when and how the adversary
successfully spoils the sampled-data control systems. A few
numerical examples and case studies can be found in Section
IV. Concluding remarks and further discussions are given in
Section V.
Notation: For two vectors a and b, col(a, b) stands for
[aT bT ]T . The sets of natural, rational, and real numbers
are denoted by N,Q, and R, respectively. The notation ‖x‖
denotes the Euclidean norm for vector x. For a real number
r ∈ R, brc denotes the largest integer which is smaller than
or equal to r. For a matrix A, kerA implies the null space of
A and im A is the range space of A.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a compromised continuous-time physical sys-
tem modeled as
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +B(u(t) + a(t)),
y(t) = Cx(t)
(1)
where x ∈ Rn is the system state, u, a ∈ Rp, and y ∈ Rq are
the input, a malicious attack, and the output of the system,
respectively, and A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×p, and C ∈ Rq×n.
Throughout the paper we suppose that the plant (1) is
connected with a discrete-time controller through a communi-
cation network as seen in Fig. 1. Specifically, it is assumed that
the discrete-time control is performed with the “sampler” for
the output y(t) with the sampling period Ts, and the “zero-
order holder (ZOH)” for both the input u(t) and the attack
signal a(t) with the sampling period Ta. Hence, u(t) and a(t)
are piecewise constant functions such that u(t) = u(iTa) and
a(t) = a(iTa) for iTa ≤ t < (i + 1)Ta. It is supposed that
u(iTa) = u¯[i] and a(iTa) = a¯[i] where u¯[i] is the output of a
discrete-time controller and a¯[i] is a discrete-time attack signal
injected through the vulnerable input communication network.
In this paper, we are interested in general multi-rate
sampled-data systems where Ts and Ta are not necessarily the
same. In particular, the ratio between Ts and Ta is assumed
to satisfy
R :=
Ts
Ta
∈ Q. (2)
In what follows, we often use the coprime fraction R = β/α
with α, β ∈ N (rather than (2)). It should be noticed that,
while the actuation times are t = iTa with i = 0, 1, · · · , there
is no reason that the sensing time (when the output y(t) is
sampled) is synchronized with the actuation time in practice.1
So, let us suppose that the sensing times are t = jTs + ∆
with j = 0, 1, · · · , where 0 ≤ ∆ < Ts is called an offset in
this paper. Note that, while actuation times and sensing times
are asynchronous, distribution of their times exhibits a pattern
that repeats in every αTs = βTa seconds (see Fig. 2) since
R = Ts/Ta = β/α.
For convenience, we define a normalized offset δ := ∆/Ts
(so that 0 ≤ δ < 1), and a new index (which is a real number)
as
jδ := δ + bj − δc, j = 1, 2, · · · .
Then jδ = (j − 1) + δ if δ > 0 and jδ = j if δ = 0. Using
the index jδ , the sampled-data system in terms of the sensing
times can be written in the discrete-time domain as
x((jδ + 1)Ts) = e
ATsx(jδTs)
+
∫ (jδ+1)Ts
jδTs
eA((jδ+1)Ts−τ)B(u(τ) + a(τ))dτ,
y(jδTs) = Cx(jδTs) =: y¯[j] (3)
for j = 1, 2, · · · , while x(1δTs) is given by x(1δTs) =
eA1δTsx(0) +
∫ 1δTs
0
eA(1δTs−τ)B(u(τ) + a(τ))dτ .
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that t = 0 be the
time when the attack is initiated. Now, for comparison, let xo
be the solution of (3) without any attack (i.e., a(t) ≡ 0) and
let yo = Cxo. It is noted that xo(0) = x(0) since the attack
starts at t = 0. Then, with the error variables
x˜(t) := x(t)− xo(t), y˜(t) := Cx˜(t),
we have the error dynamics (obtained from (3)) as
x˜((jδ + 1)Ts) = e
ATs x˜(jδTs)
+
∫ (jδ+1)Ts
jδTs
eA((jδ+1)Ts−τ)Ba(τ)dτ,
y˜(jδTs) = Cx˜(jδTs) (4)
with x˜(1δTs) =
∫ 1δTs
0
eA(1δTs−τ)Ba(τ)dτ .
The problem to be studied is to generate an attack signal a¯[i]
having the following two important features simultaneously.
Definition 1: An attack sequence {a¯[i]}∞i=0 is said to have
zero-stealthy property if y˜(jδTs) ≡ 0 for all j ≥ 1. 
This property directly implies that y(jδTs) ≡ yo(jδTs) for
all j ≥ 1, and thus, the plant (3) under the attack seemingly
operates normally as if it is attack-free. Thus, no anomaly
detector that uses u¯[i] and y¯[j] can detect the attack.
Definition 2: For a given sequence of positive thresholds
{Hk}∞k=1, an attack sequence {a¯[i]}∞i=0 is said to have disrup-
tive property with {Hk}∞k=1, if ‖x˜(tk)‖ ≥ Hk for all k ≥ 1
with a time sequence {tk}∞k=1 satisfying (k−1)(βTa) < tk ≤
k(βTa). 
The disruptive property indicates that the size of the error
state x˜(t) becomes larger than Hk at least once within the k-th
time interval of the length βTa (that is, the time interval for
1Refer to [12] for synchronous case. While [12] has more limitations such
as R being integer, the derivation of [12] is simpler than this paper.
3β times of actuations, or α times of measurements). Strength
of the attack can be considered as the values of the sequence
{Hk}∞k=1, whose selection is fully upon the adversary.
A conventional solution to this problem is, as widely studied
in the literature, the so-called zero-dynamics attack [10]. How-
ever, this attack is effective only when the system is of non-
minimum phase, and the strength of the attack is determined
solely by the plant’s zero-dynamics, and so the attacker is not
able to assign the speed of divergence. Moreover, it is not a
completely stealthy attack in the sense that its initiation causes
a transient that can be observed from the output. (Therefore, in
practice, the initial condition of the zero-dynamics attacker is
set to be small enough so that the transient can hide below the
alarm level in the anomaly detector.) On the other hand, the
proposed attack is ‘zero-stealthy’ implying that the attacked
output is exactly the same as the normal one at every sampling
times.
In this paper, we propose a zero-stealthy disruptive attack
for the sampled-data system that is possibly more lethal than
the conventional zero-dynamics attack. Our proposal is based
on the assumption that the sampled-data system (3) has a kind
of input redundancy. This is the case when the zero-order
holder works faster than the sampler (that is, R is larger than
1), or the number p of the input channel is larger than that
of the output channel, q. Then, as we shall see below, the
adversary can generate a new type of stealthy attack that has
disruptive behavior with arbitrarily large thresholds.
III. DESIGN OF ZERO-STEALTHY ATTACK WITH
DISRUPTIVE PROPERTY
The first task for the attack design is to rewrite the sampled-
data system (4) in the actuation time frame with Ta as
x˜(iTa) = A
i
dx˜(0) +
i−1∑
m=0
Ai−1−md Bda¯[m]
=
i−1∑
m=0
Ai−1−md Bda¯[m]
(5)
where the last equality follows from x˜(0) = 0, and
Ad := e
ATa ∈ Rn×n, Bd :=
(∫ Ta
0
eAτdτ
)
B ∈ Rn×p.
For progression, we need generalized notations about Ad and
Bd, which are related to both Ts and Ta as follows:
A
〈l,m〉
d := e
A(lTs−mTa), B〈l,m〉d :=
(∫ lTs−mTa
0
eAτdτ
)
B.
From the above definition, Ad and Bd also can be denoted as
A
〈0,−1〉
d and B
〈0,−1〉
d , respectively.
A. Clustering the Time Frame
To construct the attack sequence a¯[i] efficiently, let us
introduce the concept of ‘cluster.’ The k-th cluster is defined
as the time period (k − 1)βTa < t ≤ kβTa (and sometimes
we indicate the left-closed interval (k − 1)βTa ≤ t < kβTa
by calling it the k-th input-cluster). It can be seen that each
cluster contains exactly α sensing times and β actuation times.
Fig. 2: Example of a cluster when R = Ts/Ta = 4/7 = β/α.
There are β actuation times and α sensing times in one cluster.
See Fig. 2 for the case of R = 4/7 with ∆ > 0. By exploiting
these clusters, we will consider the error dynamics (4) in terms
of the clusters. For this, let us define stacked attack vector in
the k-th input-cluster, and the stacked states and the stacked
measurements in the k-th cluster, as follows: for k = 1, 2, · · · ,
a¯〈k〉 :=

a¯[(k − 1)β]
a¯[(k − 1)β + 1]
...
a¯[kβ − 1]
 ∈ Rβp,
x˜〈k〉 :=

x˜(((k − 1)α+ 1δ)Ts)
x˜(((k − 1)α+ 2δ)Ts)
...
x˜(((k − 1)α+ αδ)Ts)
 ∈ Rαn,
y˜〈k〉 := Cx˜〈k〉 ∈ Rαq
where C := Iα⊗C (Iα is the identity matrix of size α and ⊗
is the Kronecker product). It is noted that the vector y˜〈k〉 is
the collection of α measurements within one cluster.
Now, let us focus on the terminal state of each cluster, which
is denoted by x˜c[k] := x˜(kβTa) ∈ Rn. Then, from (5), one
can derive that
x˜c[k] = A
β
d x˜c[k − 1]
+
[
Aβ−1d Bd A
β−2
d Bd · · · Bd
]
a¯〈k〉
=: Aβd x˜c[k − 1] + Φca¯〈k〉
(6)
with x˜c[0] = 0. Similarly, one can derive the following for
x˜〈k〉.
Lemma 1: It follows that
x˜〈k〉 = A¯αx˜c[k − 1] + Πa¯〈k〉 (7)
y˜〈k〉 = CA¯αx˜c[k − 1] + CΠa¯〈k〉 (8)
where
A¯α :=

eA1δTs
eA2δTs
...
eAαδTs

and the (l,m)-th block of Π ∈ Rαn×βp is defined as follows:
Π(l,m) :=

A
〈lδ,m〉
d Bd, m = 1, · · · , blδRc,
B
〈lδ,blδRc〉
d , m = blδRc+ 1,
0, m = blδRc+ 2, · · · , β,
(9)
for l = 1, · · · , α.
4Proof: Consider the first cluster k = 1, in which the state
x˜(0) at the beginning of the cluster is zero and x˜c[0] = 0. With
the property bjδRcTa ≤ jδRTa = jδTs, one can compute the
state x˜(jδTs), whose sensing time jδTs belongs to this cluster,
by the variation of constant formula as follows:
x˜(jδTs) =
∫ Ta
0
eA(jδTs−τ)dτBa¯[0]
+
∫ 2Ta
Ta
eA(jδTs−τ)dτBa¯[1] + · · ·
+
∫ (bjδRc)Ta
(bjδRc−1)Ta
eA(jδTs−τ)dτBa¯[bjδRc − 1]
+
∫ jδTs
bjδRcTa
eA(jδTs−τ)dτBa¯[bjδRc]
=
bjδRc∑
m=1
eA(jδTs−mTa)
∫ mTa
(m−1)Ta
eA(mTa−τ)dτBa¯[m− 1]
+
∫ jδTs−bjδRcTa
0
eAτdτBa¯[bjδRc]
=
bjδRc∑
m=1
A
〈jδ,m〉
d Bda¯[m− 1] +B〈jδ,bjδRc〉d a¯[bjδRc].
(10)
When b1δRc = 0 (which happens if j = 1 and 1δTs < Ta),
it should be interpreted that the summation term in the above
equation is zero or null. The discussion so far verifies (7) and
the matrix Π for k = 1.
For the general k-th clusters (k > 1), the derivation is the
same (because the pattern for actuation and sensing times are
repeated along the clusters) except that the state x˜c[k − 1] =
x˜((k−1)βTa) need not be zero. Taking into account x˜c[k−1]
as the initial condition for the corresponding cluster, one can
easily verify (7) for k > 1. Once (7) is verified, (8) trivially
follows. 
Now, let us define the disruption time
tk := (k − 1)βTa + T ∗k , T ∗k ∈ (0, βTa],
which is the time when the disruptive property is met within
the k-th cluster. The sequence {T ∗k }∞i=1 is chosen by adversary,
and it is often a fixed number, for convenience, like T ∗k = βTa
or T ∗k = βTa/2 for all k. For simplicity of presentation, let
us normalize the disruption time as t∗k := T
∗
k /(βTa) ∈ (0, 1].
Then, the error state at the disruption time tk, which we will
denote as x˜a[k] := x˜(tk), is computed as follows.
Lemma 2: It follows that
x˜a[k] = A¯
∗
kx˜c[k − 1] + Φ∗ka¯〈k〉 (11)
where A¯∗k := e
AT∗k = eAt
∗
kβTa and
Φ∗k = [Φ
∗
k(1, 1), · · · ,Φ∗k(1, β)] ∈ Rn×βp (12)
Φ∗k(1,m) =

A
〈0,m−βt∗k〉
d Bd, m = 1, · · · , bβt∗kc
B
〈0,bβt∗kc−βt∗k〉
d , m = bβt∗kc+ 1
0, m = bβt∗kc+ 2, · · · , β.
Proof: The proof is similarly done as Lemma 1. For the first
cluster (k = 1), the state x˜a at time t1 is evaluated similarly as
(10) with jδTs being replaced by t1 = βt∗1Ta, and jδR being
replaced by βt∗1. Indeed, it follows that
x˜a[1] = x˜(t1) = x˜(T
∗
1 )
=
bβt∗1c∑
m=1
eA(βt
∗
1Ta−mTa)
∫ mTa
(m−1)Ta
eA(mTa−τ)dτBa¯[m− 1]
+
∫ βt∗1Ta−bβt∗1cTa
0
eAτdτBa¯[bβt∗1c]
=
bβt∗1c∑
m=1
A
〈0,m−βt∗1〉
d Bda¯[m− 1] +B〈0,bβt
∗
1c−βt∗1〉
d a¯[bβt∗1c].
Like in Lemma 1, if bβt∗1c = 0, the summation term in the
above equation becomes zero. Thus, (11) and (12) are verified
for the first cluster.
For the case k > 1, by taking into account the initial
condition x˜c[k−1] and by noting that the matrix Φ∗k is obtained
exactly the same way as for k = 1, equation (11) is easily
verified. 
Note that, if all T ∗k are chosen as a constant for all k ≥ 1,
then both A¯∗k and Φ
∗
k are constant matrices. Now, with Lemma
1 and Lemma 2, the problem of our interest is reformulated
in a cluster-wise sense; i.e., our interest becomes designing an
attack sequence a¯〈k〉 that satisfies ‖x˜a[k]‖ ≥ Hk (disruptive
property), and at the same time, y˜〈k〉 ≡ 0 for each k-th cluster
(zero-stealthy property) for all k ≥ 1.
B. Conditions for Attack Design
With equations (7), (8), and (11) at hand, conditions for at-
tack design can be established. First of all, by (8), stealthiness
of the attack is obtained if the attack sequence a¯〈k〉 for the
k-th cluster belongs to the kernel of CΠ, and so, we require
the kernel is non-trivial. Second, for the disruptive property
of the state x˜a[k] in (11), we ask the kernel of Φ∗k not to
include the kernel of CΠ because, if ker Φ∗k ⊃ ker CΠ, then
any stealthy attack has no affect on x˜a[k]. Finally, as the attack
is initiated, the state x˜(t) becomes non-zero, and therefore,
even if the attack a¯〈k− 1〉 is designed to be stealthy from the
measurement vector y˜〈k−1〉 for the (k−1)-th cluster, it may
become detectable through non-zero x˜c[k−1] = x˜((k−1)βTa)
in the k-th cluster. See (7) and (8). In order to counteract it,
we require the range space of CA¯α would belong to the range
space of CΠ so that some component of the attack sequence
a¯〈k〉 is designed to cancel the effect of x˜c[k − 1] on y˜〈k〉.
These discussions yield the following formal assumption.
Assumption 1: The following conditions hold:
(a) ker CΠ 6= {0},
(b) ker CΠ 6⊂ ker Φ∗k, k ≥ 1, with disruption times {t∗k}∞i=1,
(c) im CA¯α ⊂ im CΠ. 
A few sufficient conditions for Assumption 1 can be derived.
For example, since CΠ ∈ Rαq×βp so that αq < βp implies
ker CΠ 6= {0}, the item (a) is satisfied either when the number
p of inputs is large, or when the actuator works faster than the
sensor (i.e., R = Ts/Ta = β/α is large enough). Hence, a
sufficient condition for the item (a) is obviously qTa < pTs,
which is simpler to check than item (a). On the other hand, it
is noted that the condition (c) holds if the matrix CΠ has full
5row rank or if the matrix Π has full row rank. Finally, for the
condition (b), we have the following.
Proposition 1: If the condition (a) of Assumption 1 holds
and Bd has full column rank (i.e., rank Bd = p), then there
exists a sequence {t∗k}∞i=1 with which the condition (b) holds.
Proof: By the condition (a), pick any non-zero z =
col(z1, · · · , zβ) ∈ ker CΠ where zi ∈ Rp. Define the index
i∗ := min{i : zi 6= 0, i = 1, . . . , β}, and pick the disruption
time t∗k ∈ (0, 1] such that i∗ = βt∗k. Then, it follows from (12)
that Φ∗kz = Bdzi∗ 6= 0 since Bd has full column rank. This
implies that ker CΠ 6⊂ ker Φ∗k, i.e., the item (b). 
Remark 1: As a special case, let us consider the case when
R is a positive integer (i.e., R = N ≥ 1 so that α = 1 and
β = N ), and δ = 0. This is the case that has been studied in
[12]. In this case, we have C = C, A¯α = eATs = ANd , and Π =
[eA(Ts−Ta)Bd, eA(Ts−2Ta)Bd, · · · , eA(Ts−(N−1)Ta)Bd, Bd] =
[AN−1d Bd, A
N−2
d Bd · · · , Bd], and the conditions (a) and (c)
of Assumption 1 read as
(a) {0} 6= kerC[AN−1d Bd, · · · , Bd],
(c) im CANd ⊂ im C[AN−1d Bd, · · · , Bd].
It is clear that the above conditions hold if q < Np and
if either C[AN−1d Bd, · · · , Bd] or [AN−1d Bd, · · · , Bd] has full
row rank. On the other hand, in [12], the disruption time t∗k is
determined in the assumption as one of {1/N, 2/N, · · · , 1}.
It is noted from (12) that, for each candidate of t∗k = j/N ,
j = 1, · · · , N , the matrix Φ∗k becomes as Φ∗k|t∗k=j/N =
[Aj−1d Bd, A
j−2
d Bd, · · · , Bd, 0, · · · , 0]. To facilitate selection
of t∗k among the candidates, the condition of [12] reads as
(b’) kerC[AN−1d Bd, · · · , Bd]
6⊂ ker

Bd 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
AN−2d Bd A
N−3
d Bd · · · 0
AN−1d Bd A
N−2
d Bd · · · Bd
 .
When this condition holds, one can pick suitable t∗k among
the candidates for the condition (b) of Assumption 1. Another
sufficient condition for (b) in this special case is: (b”) kerC ∩
im Π 6= {0}. This is because (b”) means that there exists a
vector v such that Πv 6= 0 and Πv ∈ kerC. This implies that
the vector v belongs to kerCΠ while it does not belong to
ker Π, which guarantees (b’) with t∗k = 1. In Section IV-A,
we demonstrate this case with N = 1. 
C. Off-line Construction of Attack Signal
In this subsection, based on Assumption 1, we design
an attack sequence a¯[i], or equivalently a¯〈k〉, that solves
the reformulated problem; i.e., to make ‖x˜a[k]‖ ≥ Hk and
y˜〈k〉 ≡ 0 for k = 1, 2, · · · . In particular, we propose the
sequence a¯〈k〉 in the following form:
a¯〈k〉 = κkη〈k〉 + ζ〈k〉 ∈ Rβp
where κk is a positive constant and η〈k〉, ζ〈k〉 ∈ Rβp. The idea
is to pick η〈k〉 such that Πη〈k〉 is stealthy (i.e., belongs to ker C)
but disruptive (i.e., Φ∗kη〈k〉 6= 0) while κk decides the intensity
Fig. 3: Graphical interpretation of attack components
of disruption, and to pick ζ〈k〉 to counteract the effect of non-
zero x˜c[k − 1] on y˜〈k〉 (i.e., A¯αx˜c[k − 1] + Πζ〈k〉 ∈ ker C).
See Fig. 3.
The attack signal is designed sequentially, i.e., in the order
of a¯〈1〉, a¯〈2〉, and so on. As the first step, let ζ〈1〉 = 0 (since
there is no attack before the time t = 0), and pick η〈1〉 ∈
ker CΠ such that Φ∗1η〈1〉 6= 0 (whose existence is guaranteed
by Assumption 1.(a)). Then, stealthiness follows since
y˜〈1〉 = CΠa¯〈1〉 = κ1CΠη〈1〉 = 0. (13)
For the disruptive property, pick κ1 > 0 such that
κ1‖Φ∗1η〈1〉‖ ≥ H1 (14)
By this, a stealthy and disruptive attack signal a¯[0], · · · , a¯[β−
1] is obtained for the first cluster (0, βTa].
In order to design a¯〈2〉 for the second cluster, consider
y˜〈2〉 = CA¯αx˜c[1] + CΠa¯〈2〉
where x˜c[1] is computed by (6) and a¯〈2〉 = κ2η〈2〉 + ζ〈2〉.
Similarly as before, pick η〈2〉 such that
CΠη〈2〉 = 0 and Φ∗2η〈2〉 6= 0 (15)
and pick ζ〈2〉 such that
CΠζ〈2〉 = −CA¯αx˜c[1]. (16)
Since
x˜a[2] = A¯
∗
2x˜c[1] + Φ
∗
2a¯〈2〉
= A¯∗2x˜c[1] + Φ
∗
2ζ〈2〉 + Φ
∗
2κ2η〈2〉, (17)
we take κ2 such that
κ2‖Φ∗2η〈2〉‖ ≥ H2 + ‖A¯∗2x˜c[1] + Φ∗2ζ〈2〉‖. (18)
This ensures stealthiness and disruptive property of the attack
in the second cluster (βTa, 2βTa].
We now generalize the procedure.
Procedure of Attack Signal Generation:
Step k (k = 1, 2 . . . ): Take ζ〈k〉 so that the following equation
holds:
CΠζ〈k〉 = −CA¯αx˜c[k − 1] (19)
6(for k = 1, x˜c[0] = 0 so that ζ〈1〉 = 0). Pick η〈k〉 such that
η〈k〉 ∈ ker CΠ and η〈k〉 /∈ ker Φ∗k
and select a positive κk such that
κk ≥
Hk + ‖A¯∗kx˜c[k − 1] + Φ∗kζ〈k〉‖
‖Φ∗kη〈k〉‖
. (20)
With these terms, construct a¯〈k〉 = κkη〈k〉 + ζ〈k〉 and update
x˜c[k] = A
β
d x˜c[k − 1] + Φca¯〈k〉 by (6). 
Remark 2: It is noted that the construction of attack
sequence can be done off-line, or a priori before the at-
tack begins, because the procedure does not need any real-
time information. Moreover, if the normalized disruption time
t∗k ∈ (0, 1] is chosen as a fixed constant for all k ≥ 1, then
the matrices Φ∗k are the same for all k ≥ 1. Then, the vector
η〈k〉 can also be chosen as a constant η. 
We close this section by summarizing the discussions so far.
Theorem 1: Suppose that the adversary has the information
of Ts, Ta, and ∆ as well as the system information of A, B,
and C. If R = Ts/Ta ∈ Q and Assumption 1 holds with
normalized disruption times {t∗k}∞k=1, then an attack sequence
{a¯[i]}∞i=0 constructed via the proposed procedure has the zero-
stealthy property and the disruptive property for any given
{Hk}∞k=1. 
IV. EXAMPLES
A. Numerical Example: R = 1 with δ = 0
In this subsection, we study a simple example in order to
illuminate the attack generation procedure for the case R =
1 without offset, as discussed in Remark 1. For this, let us
consider the error dynamics (4) with
A =
−1 0 00 −5 −3
0 2 0
 , B =
1 00 1
0 0
 , C = [1 0 1] .
With a zero-order holder and sampler whose sampling periods
are Ta = Ts = 1 sec (and thus R = 1), its sampled-data
system is given by (5) with
Ad =
0.368 0 00 −0.121 −0.257
0 0.171 0.306
 , Bd =
0.632 00 0.086
0 0.231
 .
It is easily seen that Assumption 1 holds for the above system
(see Remark 1). In particular, q < Rp so that (a) holds and the
matrix CΠ = CBd has full row rank so that (c) holds. Also,
the matrix Bd has full column rank, and so, by (the proof of)
Proposition 1, the condition (b) holds with t∗k = i
∗/β = 1/1.
Now, for given Hk = k, an attack sequence a¯〈k〉 =
κ〈k〉η〈k〉 + ζ〈k〉 is constructed as follows:
Step 1: Set ζ〈1〉 = col(0, 0) and η〈1〉 =
col(−0.343, 0.939) ∈ ker CΠ such that Φ∗kη〈1〉 = Bdη〈1〉 6= 0.
Then, select κ1 = 3.15 to satisfy (14) (i.e., κ1‖Bdη〈1〉‖ ≥ H1).
Set x˜c[1] = Bd(κ1η〈1〉 + ζ〈1〉).
Step 2: Choose ζ〈2〉 such that (16) holds (i.e., CBdζ〈2〉 =
−CAdx˜c[1]). For convenience, let η〈2〉 = η〈1〉 as discussed in
Remark 2. Then, select κ2 for (18), and set x˜c[2] = Adx˜c[1]+
Bd(κ2η〈2〉 + ζ〈2〉).
Fig. 4: Continuous-time state trajectory x˜(t) (solid blue line)
and kerC (plane)
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Fig. 5: Continuous-time output y˜(t) (solid blue line) and
discrete-time output y˜(jTs) (red circle)
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Fig. 6: Sequence Hk (blue cross), selected κk (red circle), and
‖x˜(t)‖ (blue solid line)
Similarly, the remaining steps proceed with η〈k〉 = η〈1〉.
The designed attack sequence is injected into the control
input at t = 0 sec. Fig. 4 shows the continuous-time state x˜(t)
from its initial condition x˜(0) = col(0, 0, 0). Note that x˜(t)
is the error between the attack-free state xo(t) and the state
x(t) under attack. In this figure, it is observed that the error
x˜(t) moves far from the origin while it repeatedly encounters
kerC. The sampled error output y˜(jTs) remains zero as seen
in Fig. 5) (zero-stealthy property). On the other hand, from
Fig. 6, one can see that the disruptive property is satisfied;
that is, ‖x˜(tk)‖ ≥ Hk for (k − 1)Ta < tk ≤ kTa (here,
tk = kTa).
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Fig. 7: Zero-stealthy attack signal a(t)
B. X-38 Vehicle Example: R = 4 with δ = 0
As another example, we consider the X-38 vehicle model
which is a prototype flight test vehicles for crew return vehicle
[13]. In [13], the X-38 is operated by a multi-rate digital
controller whose holder operates four times faster than the
sampler (i.e., R = Ts/Ta = 4) with Ta = 0.04 sec and
Ts = 0.16 sec. The X-38 model has 3 inputs, 9 outputs, and
11 states (A ∈ R11×11, B ∈ R11×3, and C ∈ R9×11). More
detailed information on the X-38 plant is provided in [13],
[23].
From the information of X-38 model in [13] (that is omitted
in this paper), one can verify that Assumption 1 holds by the
following reasons:
• Rp = 12 and q = 9, and so, the condition (a) holds (i.e.,
CΠ ∈ R9×12 so that ker CΠ 6= {0}),
• the matrix Bd has full column rank, and there exists a
non-zero vector z such that CΠz = 0 where the first 3
components are a non-zero vector in R3. Then, by the
proof of Proposition 1, i∗ = 1. Therefore, the condition
(b) holds with t∗k = i
∗/β = 1/4,
• the matrix CΠ has full row rank so that im CΠ = R9 and
the condition (c) holds.
Now, following the proposed attack generation procedure,
we construct an attack sequence a¯〈k〉 = κkζ〈k〉 + η〈k〉 with
disruptive property Hk = 0.5k. In particular, we have chosen
ηk = η
= col
−0.1320.145
0.108
 ,
 0.397−0.434
−0.324
 ,
−0.3960.434
0.324
 ,
 0.132−0.144
−0.108

∈ ker CΠ and Φ∗kη 6= 0,
and ζ〈k〉’s and κk’s are selected to satisfy (19) and (20),
respectively.
To see the effect of the attack, the attack sequence is injected
into the input channel of the plant at t = 0 sec. Fig. 7
shows the injected attack and Fig. 8 illustrates the state error
x˜(t). In spite of the disruptive property seen in Fig. 8, the
measured output at sampling times look normal (Fig. 9.(c)).
In fact, the continuous-time output y(t) is not calm as seen in
Fig. 9.(b) while the attack-free continuout-time output yo(t) is
also depicted for comparison in Fig. 9.(a).
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Fig. 8: Continuous-time error state x˜(t) of the X-38 model
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(a) Continuous-time output yo(t) under no attack
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(b) Continuous-time output y(t) under the proposed attack
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(c) Discrete-time output y(jTs) under the proposed attack
Fig. 9: Continuous- and discrete-time outputs with and without
attack
C. Numerical Example: R = 0.4 with δ = 0.75
In this subsection, we show that the proposed attack is
effective under Assumption 1, even if the sampling period
of the sensor is shorter than that of the actuator. Let us
consider the case where Ta = 1 sec and Ts = 0.4 sec, so
8that R = 0.4/1 = 2/5 = β/α (i.e., there are 5 sensings
and 2 actuations for each cluster). Moreover, let us assume an
offset with δ = 0.3/0.4 = 0.75 (i.e., the sensor starts 0.3 sec
later than the actuator). The considered plant is described by
a minimal realization of
G(s) =
[
1
s+ 1
2
(s+ 2)(s+ 3)
4
(s+ 4)(s+ 5)
]
.
From the minimal realization A ∈ R5×5, B ∈ R5×3, and
C ∈ R1×5, one can verify Assumption 1 as follows:
• The plant has 3 inputs, 1 output, and R = 0.4. Hence,
q = 1 < Rp = 1.2, and so, the condition (a) holds (i.e.,
CΠ ∈ R5×6 so that ker CΠ 6= {0}).
• The matrix Bd has full column rank, and there exists a
non-zero vector z such that CΠz = 0 where the first 3
components are a non-zero vector in R3. Then, by the
proof of Proposition 1, i∗ = 1. Therefore, the condition
(b) holds with t∗k = i
∗/β = 1/2.
• The matrix CΠ has full row rank so that im CΠ = R5
and the condition (c) holds.
An attack sequence a¯[i] is constructed as proposed with
Hk = 10k. In particular, we have chosen η〈k〉 = η =
col(−0.188,−0.163, 0.746, 0.138,−0.467, 0.379) ∈ ker CΠ
for all k ≥ 1, which satisfies Φ∗kη 6= 0. The quantities κk
and ζ〈k〉 are selected appropriately by the attack generation
procedure in Section III.
The simulation results illustrate the constructed attack signal
in Fig. 10, the behavior of x˜(t) in Fig. 11, and the output signal
y˜(t) in Fig. 12, respectively. It is seen that, even if the error
variable x˜(t) and the continuous-time output y˜(t) diverge, the
output measurements (represented as red circles in Fig. 12)
remain zero, so that both stealthiness and disruptive property
are achieved.
Out of curiosity, we have simulated the case where the
actual R is 0.4004 but is estimated as R = 0.4, so that the
attack signal is designed based on R = 0.4. As seen in Fig. 13,
the measured output does not remain zero forever, but if the
estimate is sufficiently close to the true value, it is expected
that the detection of the attack is delayed until a fatal damage
is incurred in the plant.
Finally, in order to detect such an attack, one may deploy
a mechanism of intermittent output sampling in addition to
periodic sampling. Clearly, Fig. 12 and 13 show that additional
output sample will yield non-zero values that would call
attention of the operator.
V. CONCLUDING REMARK AND FUTURE WORKS
It has been recently studied that the interconnection between
continuous- and discrete-time components may make some
CPS more vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks (for instance,
the zero-dynamics attack targeting the sampling zeros [20],
[21]). We have clarified in this paper that another type of
zero-stealthy attack is also possible, if there exists enough
input redundancy for the system in the multi-rate or multi-
input sense. By taking a closer look at the state trajectory in
both continuous- and discrete-time domains, we showed that
how the additional input resources and full system knowledge
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Fig. 10: Attack sequence a(t)
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Fig. 11: Behavior x˜(t) of error dynamics
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Fig. 12: Output y˜(t) (blue solid line) and its sampled mea-
surements y˜(jδTs) with offset δ = 0.75 (red circle)
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Fig. 13: Output y˜(t) and its sampled measurements when R =
0.4004, Ts = 0.4004 and Ta = 1 while the attack is designed
assuming R = 0.4, Ts = 0.4, and Ta = 1.
enable the adversary to compromise the inter-sample behavior
of the sampled-data system, while being perfectly undetected
at each sampling time.
9Future works include consideration of input saturation and
investigation of the case when R, the ratio of Ts and Ta,
is real number. By analyzing the proposed construction of
attack signal, we expect to figure out quantitative relationship
between Hk and the saturation level. When the ratio between
sampling period and actuation period is a real number, by
approximating it as a rational number sufficiently closely, we
expect to delay the detection of attack as much as we want,
under strictly positive error threshold of anomaly detector.
Finally, it is also necessary to develop a method to detect
the proposed attack. At this moment, we just think that
intermittent random sampling of the output in addition to
periodic sampling, removing unnecessary input channels, or
concealing the system knowledge may be helpful.
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